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Abstract. We consider the exercise of power in competitive markets for goods, 
labour and credit.  We offer a definition of power and show that if contracts are 
incomplete it may be exercised either in Pareto-improving ways or to the 
disadvantage of those without power. Contrasting conceptions of power including 
bargaining power, market power, and consumer sovereignty are considered.  
Because the exercise of power may alter prices and other aspects of exchanges, 
abstracting from power may miss essential aspects of an economy. The political 
aspect of private exchanges challenges conventional ideas about the appropriate 
roles of market and political competition in ensuring the efficiency and 
accountability of economic decisions.  
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Background 
Power is exercised in the competitive markets for goods, labour and credit. We 
consider this aspect of economic power, setting aside the widely recognized exercise of 
power by members of governments and other coercive bodies and the influence of 
economic groups on governmental policy.   
 ‘An economic transaction is a solved political problem ...’, wrote Abba 
Lerner (1972, p. 259). ..‘economics has gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by 
choosing solved political problems as its domain.’  Prior to the development of modern 
contract theory, the standard approach to power among economists was aptly summed 
up by Paul Samuelson (1957, p. 894), ‘Remember that in a perfectly competitive 
market, it really does not matter who hires whom; so have labor hire capital.’ As if 
responding to Samuelson, John Kenneth Galbraith (1967, p. 47), chided economists for 
not having asked ‘why power is associated with some factors [of production] and not 
with others?’ But with some notable exceptions (for example, Zeuthen, 1930; Shapley 
and Shubik, 1967; Samuels, 1973; Lindblom 1977; Basu, 1986;Takada, 1995; 
Hirshleifer, 1991;  Chichilnisky and Heal, 1984; Lundberg and Pollak, 1994; 
Rotemberg, 1993; Pagano, 1999; Bardhan, 2005; Aghion and Tirole, 1997) economists 
have treated power as the concern of other disciplines and extraneous to economic 
explanation. The term does not appear among the 1,300 or so index entries of the 
leading graduate microeconomics text (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). 
The reason is that Samuelson’s claim is true in the Walrasian model:  if contracts 
are complete, ‘hiring’ simply means ‘buying’. ‘What does it mean’, Oliver Hart (1995) 
asked, ‘to put someone “in charge” of an action or decision if all actions can be 
specified in a contract?’  But as  an empirical matter, as Marx (1867), Coase (1937), 
Simon (1951) and others have stressed,  the firm  is a political institution in the sense 
that some members of the firm routinely give commands while others are constrained 
by the threat of sanctions to obey. To say that the manager has the right to decide what 
the worker will do means only that he has the legitimate authority to do this, not the 
power to secure compliance. Given that in a liberal economy management is sharply 
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restricted in the kinds of punishment they can inflict, and given that the employee is 
free to leave, the fact that orders are typically obeyed is a puzzle. Why, in Coase’s 
initial formulation, is the command of the manager (to move ‘from department Y to 
department X’) obeyed (Coase, 1937)?  
Noticing the lack of a good answer, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) challenged the 
Coasean idea that the firm is a mini ‘command economy’, suggesting that the 
employment contract is no different in this respect from other contracts.  
The firm ... has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action 
any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting 
between any two people...Wherein then is the relationship between a 
grocer and his employee different from that between a grocer and his 
customer? (1972, p. 777)  
 
Hart (1989), p. 1771) offered the following response to Alchian and Demsetz: 
… the reason that an employee is likely to be more responsive to what 
his employer wants than a grocer is that the employer...can deprive the 
employee of the assets he works with and hire another employee to 
work with these assets, while the customer can only deprive the grocer 
of his customer and as long as the customer is small, it is presumably 
not very difficult for the grocer to find another customer. 
 
Hart motivates the difference between the grocer and the employer by the assumption 
that the employee needs access not just to a job (and hence some assets) but to this 
particular employer’s assets. This might be the case due to a complementarity between 
the two (the employee may have made an investment in training which is of value only 
when combined with this particular asset, for example). Other less obvious (and 
probably more important) examples come to mind. Excluding an employee from access 
to a particular asset may require the employee to relocate, disrupting family and 
friendships. The loss of a job may also harm the employee’s reputation.  
While transaction-specific investments of this type undoubtedly explain some 
authority relationships – in company towns, and for some professional jobs and 
managers, for example – the explanation seems insufficiently general to provide an 
adequate explanation of the entire authority structure of the firm, especially in large 
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urban labour markets and for non-professional employees. We thus need a 
complementary explanation based on the fact that the employee excluded from access 
to her current employer’s asset may not find access to any asset even in a competitive 
economy in which transaction-specific assets are absent. This will require clarity about 
what we mean by power.  
Power as a political means to gain economic advantage in private exchange 
Because of its close connection to value-laden words such as ‘coercion’ and 
‘freedom’ the term itself has proven to be controversial among philosophers and 
political theorists (Nozick, 1969; Lukes, 1974; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Barry, 
1976; Taylor, 1982). Nonetheless, common usage suggests several characteristics that 
must when power is said to be exercised. First, power is interpersonal, an aspect of a 
relationship among people, not a characteristic of a solitary individual. Second, the 
exercise of power involves the threat and use of sanctions. Indeed, many political 
theorists regard sanctions as the defining characteristic of power. Lasswell and Kaplan  
(1950, p. 75) make the use of ‘severe sanctions ... to sustain a policy against opposition’ 
a defining characteristic of a power relationship, and Parsons (1967, p. 308) regards 
‘the presumption of enforcement by negative sanctions in the case of recalcitrance’ a 
necessary condition for the exercise of power. Third, the concept of power should be 
normatively indeterminate, allowing for Pareto-improving outcomes (as has been 
stressed by students of power from Hobbes to Parsons), but also susceptible to abuse in 
ways that harm others in violation of ethical principles. Finally, power must be 
sustainable as a Nash equilibrium of an appropriately defined game. Power may be 
exercised in disequilibrium situations, of course, but, as an enduring aspect of social 
structure, it should be a characteristic of an equilibrium.  
The following sufficient condition for the exercise of power captures these four 
desiderata: For B to have power over A, it sufficient that, by imposing or threatening to 
impose sanctions on A, B is capable of affecting A’s actions in ways that further B’s 
interests, while A lacks this capacity with respect to B (Bowles and Gintis, 1992).  
The fact that sanctions are essential to the exercise of power in our sense makes it 
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distinct from other means of influencing the behaviour of others that may operate even 
in the complete absence of strategic interaction, as in a Walrasian market setting.  
Consider, for example, the standard definition due to Robert Dahl (1957, pp. 202–3): 
‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do.’ But one can affect the behaviour of another in ways that do not involve 
power in the usual sense of that term. If we buy a commodity, there will be a whole 
series of market effects through the economy which entail others doing things they 
would not otherwise have done. But to say that our purchase of bread is an exercise of 
power over some unknown wheat farmer with whom we do not interact strategically is 
to expand the concept of power beyond recognition. By making the threat of sanctions a 
necessary aspect of power we also exclude forms of interpersonal influence such as 
persuasion and the provision of information.  
Short-side Power in Labor, Credit, and Goods Markets 
The power that may be exercised by an economic actor depends on the actor’s 
position in the institutions of society.  Power may be exercised by economic actors who 
are on the short side of a non-clearing market, namely, the side of the market on which 
the number of desired transactions is less, that is, employers in a labour market with 
unemployment, lenders in a loan market with borrowers facing credit constraints, and 
so on. Because those holding power in these cases are those on the short side of the 
market, we term this ‘short-side power’.   This clarifies the difference between the 
employer and the grocer in Hart’s response to Alchian and Demsetz: the sanctions 
imposed on the employee by depriving him of access to the capital good are severe 
because, in a labour market with perpetual excess supply of labour, finding another job 
will be difficult, while the costs imposed on the grocer by the departing customer are 
negligible or zero. The reason why the consumer, in switching to another seller, does 
not impose a sanction on the grocer is that the grocer (in competitive equilibrium) was 
maximizing profits by selecting a level of sales that equates marginal cost to the 
exogenously given price, and, this being the case, a small variation in sales has only a 
second-order effect on profits.  
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Let us check to see that this conception of power applies to the employment 
relationship in which transaction specificity is absent. We know that in a standard 
labour-discipline model (Gintis, 1976; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985), in 
equilibrium the worker receives a rent: the present value of the job exceeds her next-
best alternative (job search) and, because she fears losing his job, she works harder than 
she would have in the absence of the employer’s incentive strategy.  These results 
together imply that employer has caused the worker to act in the employer’s interest by 
credibly threatening to sanction the worker. The employee lacks this capacity with 
respect to the employer for, were the employee to threaten the employer with a sanction 
should he not raise the wage (to damage his machinery or beat him up or simply to 
work less hard), the threat would not be credible. The employer would simply refuse to 
respond, knowing that it would not be in the interest of the employee to carry out the 
threat.  
Note that the exercise of power allows a Pareto improvement over a counterfactual 
condition in which power cannot be exercised, namely, that the worker is hired at her 
reservation wage and works at the reservation effort level. This follows directly as we 
know from the fact that the worker receives an equilibrium rent at the wage offered by 
the employer. Both expected worker lifetime utility and firm profits are higher in 
equilibrium (with power being exercised) than at the (power-absent) reservation 
position. This is yet another example of a situation in which the exercise of power helps 
to address coordination failures, albeit sometimes with objectionable consequences 
those without power. An example from Bowles (2004) follows. 
Suppose the employer determines (in addition to the wage)  some aspect of the job 
affecting workplace amenities, including not only such innocuous things as  the quality 
of the music on the office sound system but also management practices affecting the 
employee’s dignity, such as not being subjected to racial insults, sexual harassment or 
other on-the-job indignities. If the firm sets these amenities to maximize profits, it 
follows that  the employer can inflict first-order costs on the worker (by reducing the 
amenity a small amount) at second-order cost to himself (the costs are second-order 
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because due to profit maximization the derivative of profits with respect to the level of 
amenities is zero). Thus the competitive equilibrium in an employment relationship 
gives the employer the capacity not only to exercise power to attenuate coordination 
problems but also to exercise power arbitrarily, that is, to inflict costs on another at 
virtually no cost to himself. When this power is exercised in unethical ways it may be 
termed coercive.  
Thus the strategic interaction between the employer and employee allows the 
exercise of power in a manner conforming to the four desiderata outlined above: 
sanctions are credibly threatened (and used) in a strategic interaction describing a Nash 
equilibrium, and the resulting exercise of power is Pareto-improving over a reasonable 
counterfactual but may also be used coercively. 
It is easy to check the that power in the sense defined may be exercised in the 
standard  principal–agent model of the credit market as well. The lender offers the 
borrower terms that are preferred to the borrower’s reservation position, promising to 
make additional loans in the future if the borrower repays the loan. In this contingent 
renewal model, the borrower pursues a less risky strategy than would have been the 
case had the lender not offered a rent. Where the borrower’s participation constraint 
holds as an equality, power in the sense defined cannot be exercised for the simple 
reason that the borrower is indifferent between the current transaction and the next-best 
alternative, so the only sanction permitted in a liberal economy – termination of the 
contract – has no force.  
Short-side power may be contrasted with the ‘markets and hierarchies’ approach 
pioneered by Oliver Williamson (1985). Rather than seeing firms simply as ‘islands of 
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious cooperation’, in Robertson’s (1923, p. 
85) apt words, the incomplete contracts approach traces the exercise of power to both 
the structure of markets and the structure of firms. The firm is an important venue in 
which power is exercised, but, as the credit market model makes clear, power may be 
exercised in the absence of firms or indeed any organizational structure whatsoever. 
Short-side power is exercised in markets, not simply outside markets or despite 
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markets.  
Wealth, Power, and ‘Consumer Sovereignty’ 
Thus an agent’s location in the economic structure of a society – on the short side of 
a non clearing market -- may make it possible for him to  exercise power over others.  
How are agents assigned to these positions of short-side power?  Given that employing 
others requires capital and that borrowing substantial amounts typically requires that 
the borrower have sufficient wealth to invest in the project or to provide collateral, an 
important determinant of an individual’s assignment to a position of short-side power is 
the individual’s wealth. The wealthy may exercise power over those to whom they lend, 
who in turn may exercise power over those (managers or other employees) whom they 
hire. As a result, power cascades downward from the loan market to the market for 
managers to the market for non-managerial employees (Bowles, 2004). 
A less obvious case concerns the power of the consumer, sometimes summarized by 
the term ‘consumer sovereignty’. Consider a principal–agent model involving difficult- 
to-measure product quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Gintis, 1976). In equilibrium, the 
buyer pays the seller a price exceeding the seller’s next-best alternative and promises 
continued purchases contingent on the seller providing high-quality goods. The seller’s 
prospect of losing the resulting rent conferred by the buyer induces the seller to provide 
higher quality than would have been provided in the absence of the threatened sanction. 
Thus the buyer has exercised power over the seller in the sense just defined. 
As the example suggests, buyers may exercise power over sellers whenever the 
buyer’s threat to switch to an alternative seller is credible and inflicts a cost on the 
seller. Consider two monopolistically competitive sellers (that is, firms facing 
downward-sloping demand functions) and a consumer who is indifferent between 
purchasing from one or the other. Both sellers have chosen a level of output to 
maximize profits, setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue (which is less than 
the price because the demand curve is downward sloping). For both sellers, price thus 
exceeds marginal cost, and as a result the consumer’s choice confers a rent on one and 
deprives the other of the rent. The reader may wonder how the rent can arise if the firm 
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has chosen the output level to maximize profits, each setting the derivative of profits 
with respect to sales equal to zero. But the buyer’s switch from one to the other seller is 
not a movement along a demand function (the basis of the firm’s output choice), but 
rather is a horizontal shift in the demand function (inwards for the firm the consumer 
rejected, outwards for the firm to which he switched). As a result of the switch, for the 
fortunate firm it is profit maximizing to sell one more unit at the going price.  
Ironically, the idealized Walrasian conditions under which consumer sovereignty is 
said to hold give the consumer no power in the sense defined here, while deviations 
from the canonical competitive assumption that price equals marginal cost (because 
firms face downward sloping demand functions) create an environment in which the 
consumer may exercise power. Of course, the strategic position of the consumer as one 
of many principals facing a single agent is quite unlike that of the employer facing 
many potential employees or the lender facing many potential borrowers. As Hart 
observed about the consumer and the grocer, a single consumer will not generally be in 
a position to command the supplier to improve the product quality and expect the 
supplier to obey. The power of consumers is thus limited by the difficulties the many 
principals face in acting in a coordinated fashion.  
Non-clearing markets and inefficient competitive equilibria 
Where power is exercised by a principal who confers a rent on an agent and 
monitors the agent’s actions – as in the markets for labour, credit, and goods just 
analysed – the equilibrium allocation will generally be neither Pareto-efficient nor 
technically efficient. The reason for the first is that the principal is constrained not by 
the agent’s reservation utility but by the agent’s best-response function. As a result, 
small changes in the instruments controlled by the principal – the wage, the rate of 
interest or the price – incur only second-order costs or benefits for the principal but 
first-order benefits and costs for the agent. For the actions controlled by the agent the 
reverse is true.  Therefore, there must exist some set of small variations away from the 
equilibrium allocation that improve the utility of both principal and agent. A labour 
market example of such a Pareto improvement is a small increase in the wage 
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accompanied by a small increase in worker effort.   
The allocation will be technically inefficient because the principal chooses the 
enforcement strategy with respect to the private costs (the costs of both the rent 
conferred on the agent and the monitoring) while there is no social cost associated with 
the rent (because, unlike the monitoring costs, it is a pure transfer and is not resource 
using). From the equilibrium allocation, therefore, there must exist a technical 
efficiency-improving increase in the agent’s rent and a reduction in monitoring. 
Exploiting these potential efficiency gains requires changes in the information and 
incentive structure of the interaction, for example by making the agent the residual 
claimant on his or her non-contractible actions, if this is possible.  
The three cases for which we have analysed the exercise of power – by the buyer 
over the seller, the lender over the borrower, and the employer over the employee – are 
members of a generic class of power relationships which are sustainable in the 
equilibrium of a system of voluntary competitive exchanges. In all three, those with 
power are transacting with agents who receive rents and hence are not indifferent 
between the current transaction and their next-best alternative. This being the case, 
there must exist other identical agents who are quantity constrained, namely, the 
unemployed, those excluded from the loan market or restricted in the amount they can 
borrow, and sellers who fail to make a sale. For this situation to characterize an 
equilibrium it must be that markets do not clear, which, as we have seen will be the 
case. 
 Power as we have defined it can be exercised in other ways, even when markets 
clear. An interesting (if perhaps not empirically important) example is provided by the 
case of optimal job fees, in which the fee eliminates the job rent ex ante so the market 
clears, the worker being indifferent between taking the job and paying the fee or not. 
But an ex post rent nonetheless exists, giving the employer the ability to sanction the 
employee. A job fee of this type is a pure case of an employee’s transaction-specific 
investment, and the basis of the power of the employer in this case is an example of 
Hart’s reasoning, above.  
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All three of those exercising power in the above examples – buyer, lender, 
employer – have in common that the party that contributes money to the transaction – 
the buyer’s purchase price, the lender’s loan, the employer’s wage offer – is the one 
exercising power. This may seem an analytical foundation for the familiar adage that 
‘money talks’, but the conclusion is misleading. Recall that in the centrally planned 
Communist economies it was generally the case that consumer durables (and many 
other consumer goods) sold below market-clearing prices. The resulting excess demand 
was allocated through a process of queuing and by other means (Kornai, 1980). In this 
case the producers (sellers) were on the short side of the market, and those bringing 
money to the transaction – the buyers – were the long-siders, some of whom failed to 
make a trade. The notorious inferiority in the quality of consumer goods in centrally 
planned economies to those in capitalist economies may be explained in part by the fact 
that consumers were long-siders in the former and short-siders in the latter. Or, to put it 
more graphically, one reason why Fords were better cars than their Cold War era 
Russian equivalents is that in Russia customers waited in line to purchase Volgas while 
in the United States Ford salesmen lined up to sell customers cars. Another reason is 
that in the United States workers waited in line to get jobs at Ford. 
Other conceptions of power 
Other uses of the term ‘power’ are common in economics. (We do not address the 
concept of ‘coalitional power’ advanced by Shapley and Shubik, 1954, as it has found 
application primarily in the analysis of committees voting and  other arenas addressed 
by political scientists.) ‘Purchasing power’ is just another word for the position of one’s 
budget constraint (or wealth), and it does not concern the exercise of sanctions or 
indeed any strategic interaction at all. ‘Market power’ arises in thin markets in which an 
actor can benefit by varying a price. In the standard monopolistic competition case the 
seller is said to have market power. The seller is less constrained in the sense that he 
faces a downward sloping demand rather than horizontal demand function, while the 
consumer is more constrained in that there may be less choice among suppliers. But we 
have just seen that in this case the consumer who switches from one seller to another 
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confers a rent on his favoured firm. (This why Ford salesmen line up to sell you cars.) 
Thus, if the buyer can credibly threaten to withdraw the rent he may be able to exercise 
short-side power over the seller. It thus is not clear how to reconcile usual notions of 
power – the use of sanctions to gain advantage – with the statement that the monopolist 
has power over the consumer.  
Finally, there ‘bargaining power’, typically meaning the share of the joint surplus 
which a party gains in a bargain (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986). Reflecting 
this usage, the exponents used in the ‘Nash product’ to solve the generalized Nash 
bargaining model are said to refer to the bargaining power of the two parties. Used this 
way, bargaining power refers to outcomes – to how much advantage one may gain – 
rather than to any particular means of attaining it (for example by threatening a 
sanction). If the bargaining problem is embedded in an ongoing interaction, then 
bargaining power and short-side power appear not only unrelated but even opposed. In 
the competitive equilibrium of the standard principal–agent model of the labour market, 
for example, the principal receives his reservation return (given by the zero profit 
condition) while the agent receives a rent.  Therefore, the bargaining-power perspective 
would say that the employee has all the bargaining power. But the short-side power 
perspective would conclude that, far from a sign that the employee is powerful, the rent 
conferred on the employee as a profit-maximizing choice of the employer is the reason 
why the employer has power over the employee.  The employee receives the rent 
because his services cannot be costlessly contracted for, and the employer profits in this 
case by paying to exercise power over the employee.  
 The fact that the exercise of power is ubiquitous in private exchange shows that it 
is mistaken to think of society as composed of a political sphere, meaning governments 
and other bodies with formal powers of coercion, and a private economic sphere in 
which the exercise of power is absent. The rejection of this public–private division 
raises important issues concerning the appropriate scope of for democratic political 
competition (in addition to market competition) as a guarantor of accountability in the 
economy (Dahl, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1993). 
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